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Abstract
Pilot projects are often used to test innovations; however, pilot projects, viewed as tools, are 
rarely addressed as an object for research. This paper, in which pilot projects are viewed as pub-
lic policy instruments producing specific effects, addresses the research question: how does the 
use of multidisciplinary pilot projects as experimentation and implementation instruments 
reshape modes of public governance in the Belgian health sector in a context of transition and 
ongoing devolution? An ethnographic study was conducted, focusing on the specific case of 
the Belgian joint plan, “Integrated Care for Better Health”, which targets chronic patients and 
was intended to initiate a major transition from a fragmented to an integrated care system for 
chronic patients. The analysis concerns the specific implementation modalities designed by the 
authorities, which consisted of the launch of pilot projects involving professionals in the field 
coming from different sectors in an iterative and incremental co-creation process. This choice 
caused new vertical interdependences to emerge between the levels of the health care system, 
transforming the roles of both the authorities and hands-on professionals involved; it also de-
noted a transition towards a more negotiated governance, in the course of which several types 
of knowledge and evidence have been mobilised.
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Introduction
Pilot projects are often used in a variety of sectors in innovative contexts. In the scientific litera-
ture, one can find numerous articles relating the results of a specific pilot project in a particular 
sector, whereas the literature analysing the pilot project tool as an object for research is much 
rarer (Pinson, 2005). In other words, research focuses generally on the experiment conducted 
as part of the pilot project under study, and not on the pilot project tool as a phenomenon per 
se, which should, nevertheless, also be worthy of scientific attention (Vreugdenhil et al., 2010). 
The pilot project is a specific work method, fulfilling a function of experimentation, which is 
mobilised in a plethora of sectors and allows a learning while doing approach (Kay & Boxall, 
2015; Lee, 1999). This tool offers the possibility to test the innovation at stake in real-world 
settings at small and controlled scales, which limits the impact of potential failure or negative 
side effects (Vreugdenhil & Ker Rault, 2010). Furthermore, the actions undertaken as part of 
the experiment are expected to be more reversible (Musselin, 2005; Zurlo & Nunes, 2016) and, 
for this reason, are supposed to be less frightening for the stakeholders involved. 
Therefore, pilot projects are often used by policy makers in innovative contexts (Vreugdenhil 
et al., 2010), to learn from the experimentation carried out (Engström & Lidelöw, 2015) and to 
create new knowledge and produce evidence for policy-making (Sanderson, 2002; Vreugdenhil 
& Ker Rault, 2010). They are thus expected to help orient future political action and policy 
development. In this way, the pilot project constitutes a tool for, “improving the effectiveness 
of policy responses” (Sanderson, 2002, p. 4). The purpose is to work collaboratively (Zurlo & 
Nunes, 2016) in order to identify what works in what context (Sanderson, 2002; Vreugdenhil 
& Ker Rault, 2010). 
Nevertheless, Sanderson (2002) argues that politicians/policy makers often divert pilot pro-
jects from their primary function of experimenting and learning. Instead, they only use them 
as a means of exemplification, demonstration and legitimation when the produced evidence 
corroborates their political priorities. Actually, according to Cook (1997, p. 40, cited in Sander-
son, 2002, p. 5), “the politician’s prime goal is to be re-elected rather than to respect techni-
cal evidence”, which constitutes political short-termism. On the contrary, experimentations 
conducted as part of pilot projects are often long-term endeavours, which require, in contrast, 
sufficient time to produce effects from which lessons can be learnt (Sanderson, 2002). 
As collective experiments (Zurlo & Nunes, 2016), pilot projects also gather a diversity of stake-
holders who have to interact and work together to create new solutions to solve a problem by 
exchanging their respective knowledge and stances (Segrestin, 2004): as the old proverb says: 
two heads are better than one. In this way, due to their inherent interactionist nature (Pinson, 
2005), “pilot projects are [also] means to establish communication between actors that usually 
do not cooperate” (Vreugdenhil & Ker Rault, 2010, p. 122). This explains why, besides experi-
mentation, pilot projects can also be mobilised for policy implementation (Vreugdenhil et al., 
2010) when, for example, the policy programme cannot be implemented in a conventional 
manner. In this case, the use of the pilot project tool provides a means for a staged implemen-
tation process (Vreugdenhil & Ker Rault, 2010), leveraging the collaborative dynamic between 
involved stakeholders in order to, “pragmatically put fully developed policy into practice” 
(Vreugdenhil et al., 2010, p. 13).
In this paper, which in a certain sense echoes the old, but not outdated, research of Pinson 
(2005) on urban projects, pilot projects are not analysed only as simple tools or work methods 
but as specific public policy instruments (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2005). Accordingly, before 
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presenting the research question addressed in this paper, it seems appropriate to dwell a little 
on the very notion of public policy instruments in order to understand the reasoning behind 
the formulation of this research question as well as its relevance. It would nevertheless seem 
illusory and unnecessary to develop all the plethora of different approaches and taxonomies 
that were developed regarding policy instruments in the scientific literature. Therefore, in the 
next section, I will select the elements which seem relevant for analysing the central object of 
this article: the pilot project phenomenon. 
Policy instruments: contributions of scientific literature and research 
question
Policy instruments are one of the three main components of a public policy, the two others 
being the policy foundations, referring to the aims pursued via the policy, and the public tar-
geted (Hassenteufel, 2011). Policy instruments constitute the means by which ideas stabilised 
during the policy formulation process are supposed to be implemented (Ali, 2013). They can be 
viewed as “a set of techniques by which governmental authorities wield their power in attempt-
ing to ensure support and effect (or prevent) social change” (Vedung, 1998, p. 21, cited in Bor-
rás & Edquist, 2019, p. 215). So, “policy instruments are techniques of governance that, one 
way or another, involve the utilization of state authority or its conscious limitation” (Howlett, 
2005, p. 31).  
The scientific literature pertaining to policy instruments revolves around three main topics: 
•	 the numerous categorisations and typologies of policy instruments produced over time in 
this field of research, e.g., the well-known NATO1-scheme developed by Christopher Hood 
(Hood et al., 2007) or the “carrots, sticks and sermons-approach” developed by Vedung 
(Vabo & Røiseland, 2012);
•	 the way instruments are chosen by governments through the identification of instrument 
choice patterns; and, more recently
•	 the way instruments are combined in specific mixes (Capano et al., 2020; Howlett et al., 
2018). (This third topic will not be addressed in this paper). 
If listing all the existing categorisations and typologies of policy instruments would not be of 
much use in the case at hand, the interesting distinction between substantive and procedural 
instruments should be mentioned. Substantive instruments are “policy techniques or mecha-
nisms designed to directly or indirectly affect the production, consumption and distribution of 
different kinds of goods and services in society” (Howlett et al., 2018, p. 7), whereas procedural 
instruments, “on the other hand, affect production, consumption and distribution processes 
only indirectly, if at all, and instead are concerned with altering aspects of a governments own 
workings” (Howlett et al., 2018, p. 9). Due to the above-mentioned elements that characterise 
the pilot project, the latter can be viewed as a procedural instrument which help define the 
content of substantive policies. 
Regarding the choice of public policy instruments, the theoretical framework of Lascoumes 
and Le Galès (2005), which belongs to the sociology of public action, is particularly relevant to 
the case at hand. These two scholars analysed public action and state governance modes by fo-
cusing on public policy instrumentation, which constitutes “a means of orienting relations be-
tween political society (via the administrative executive) and civil society (via its administered 
1 — Nodality, Authority, Treasure, and Organization
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subjects)” (Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007, p. 1). They define public policy instrumentation as:
the set of problems posed by the choice and use of instruments (techniques, meth-
ods of operation, devices) that allow government policy to be made material and op-
erational. Another way of formulating the issue is to say that it involves not only 
understanding the reasons that drive towards retaining one instrument rather than 
another, but also envisaging the effects produced by these choices. (2007, p. 4) 
As much as the objectives of a public policy, instrumentation is also a political choice (Howlett, 
1991; Howlett et al., 2018) because the choice of modes of action, and therefore of instru-
ments, which can be the subject of political conflicts, will partly structure the process and its 
results and have an impact on power relations (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2005). Interestingly: 
a public policy instrument constitutes a device that is both technical and social, that 
organizes specific social relations between the state and those it is addressed to, ac-
cording to the representations and meanings it carries. It is a particular type of in-
stitution, a technical device with the generic purpose of carrying a concrete concept 
of the politics/society relationship and sustained by a concept of regulation. (Las-
coumes & Le Gales, 2007, p. 4) 
This means that the choice of one instrument over another is not trivial and is not only a 
technical choice, as suggested in the functionalist approach. Instead, instruments structure 
public action and produce specific, sometimes unexpected, effects, independent of the primary 
purposes assigned to them (Borrás & Edquist, 2019; Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2005). Indeed, as 
Lascoumes & Le Galès (2007, p. 4) put it, “public policy instruments are not tools with perfect 
axiological neutrality, equally available: on the contrary, they are bearers of values, fuelled by 
one interpretation of the social and by precise notions of the mode of regulation envisaged”. 
In view of all this, this paper intends to contribute to the scant literature focusing on the pi-
lot project phenomenon as well as, to some extent, on the public action instruments studies 
by providing an in-depth analysis of the consequences of the use of this specific instrument 
by policy-makers in terms of public governance. The focus here is on the specific case of the 
implementation of a public policy in the Belgian health sector via the launch of pilot projects 
simultaneously used as experimentation and implementation instruments: the “Integrated 
Care for Better Health” (IC4BH) joint plan targeting chronic patients. Therefore, this paper is 
based on the following research question: how does the use of multidisciplinary pilot projects 
as experimentation and implementation instruments reshape modes of public governance in 
the Belgian health sector in a context of transition and ongoing devolution? 
The choice of analysing this specific case comes from the fact that it can be noticed that for the 
past fifteen years there has been an increasingly systematic recourse to the use of pilot projects 
by the Belgian authorities to implement new public policies, especially in the health care sector. 
One can mention, inter alia: “therapeutic projects” and “psy 107” projects in the mental health 
sector; “multidisciplinary local networks” for diabetics (Type 2) and patients with renal insuffi-
ciency; mobile health projects and “integrated care” pilot projects for chronic patients launched 
as a means to implement the joint plan entitled “Integrated Care for Better Health” (IC4BH), 
which was approved in October 2015.
The interest of focusing on this case is twofold: 
•	 lessons can be learnt regarding this way of operating at the national Belgian level, which is 
of interest for the Belgian authorities; and
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•	 it may be of interest at an international level for countries that are tempted to resort to 
pilot projects as part of the implementation of their public policies. 
Background
The Belgian Healthcare System
The current Bismarckian Belgian health care system combines a compulsory health insurance, 
which is part of the global Belgian social protection system, with a non-mandatory supplemen-
tary health insurance, both of which are based on the principle of solidarity (Saltman et al., 
2004). The entire Belgian population is entitled to medical care, either as a beneficiary or as a 
dependent (spouses, children, grandchildren). The supplementary health insurance is provided 
by sickness funds upon payment of insurance premiums and gives access to additional ben-
efits, reimbursements and services.  
Sickness funds play the role of intermediaries between the National Institute for Health and 
Disability Insurance (NIHDI), i.e., the parastatal institution in charge of managing the national 
health care budget, the patients and their health practitioners regarding the reimbursement of 
medical expenditures. In order to ensure their rights to compulsory health insurance benefits, 
beneficiaries have to affiliate with a sickness fund of their choice. 
In Belgium, the majority of physicians are self-employed and remunerated on a fee-for-service 
basis (OECD & European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2017): they are paid 
for each service performed. Patients pay their medical costs upfront and, in exchange, receive 
a certificate that proves the payment has been made. Upon presentation of this document, 
patients can be partly refunded by their sickness funds. The amount of reimbursement covered 
by compulsory insurance is set by the NIHDI and listed in an official “nomenclature” as is the 
case with all reimbursement rates related to every refundable medical act. The part that is not 
reimbursed, the proportion assumed by patients, is called the user fee or patient fee (Service 
Public Federal Securité Sociale, 2016). 
In certain specific cases (low income, disability, etc.), a third-party payer system is applied.2 
Then, patients only pay their user fees to their practitioners and, “the reimbursement rates are 
applied directly” (Federal Public Service Social Security, 2012, p. 44). Practitioners receive the 
rest of their fees, the amount covered by compulsory insurance, from their patients’ sickness 
funds. The difference here is that patients pay nothing upfront. 
Belgium applies the principle of freedom of choice (OECD & European Observatory on Health 
Systems and Policies, 2017), which is a common feature of social health insurance systems 
(Saltman et al., 2004). Sometimes, this leads to an over-consumption of health care and, con-
sequently, an increase in healthcare expenditure (Palier, 2017). Specifically, the principle of 
freedom of choice means that, “patients can select their provider” (Saltman et al., 2004, p. 
249). They are free to choose their sickness fund, their doctor(s) (GPs and specialists) and to go 
to the hospital of their choice. In other words, GPs do not play the role of gatekeepers as they 
do in national health care systems (such as in the UK and Sweden). In the latter, patients first 
visit their GP, before being allowed to consult a specialist (Palier, 2017; Saltman et al., 2004).
Alternatively, patients are also free to enrol at a Medical Health Centre (MHC, maison médi-
cale in French) of their choice. MHCs operate an alternative health care model, bringing to-
gether first-line care workers (general practitioners, nurses, physiotherapists, psychologists, 
2 — http://www.riziv.fgov.be/fr/themes/cout-remboursement/facilite-financiere/Pages/tiers-payant.aspx#.Waq8Y-
chJY2w (accessed on 20 January 2020).
322 In te r n a t ion a l  R e v ie w o f  P ubl i c  Pol i c y,  2 :3
social workers, etc.) into multidisciplinary teams. They work in concert in order to care for 
their patients and enhance or maintain their social welfare. Importantly, most Belgian MHCs 
have recourse to an alternative funding model that relies on capitation payments for first-line 
medical acts (general medicine, physiotherapy, nursing care),3 in contrast to the prevailing fee-
for-service model.4 The most recent figures available show that in 2015, the number of MHCs 
amounted to 151,5 compared to 67 in 2005. Furthermore, 3% (336,247 patients) of the Belgian 
population was affiliated with an MHC in 2015.6
A joint plan 
Belgium is a federal state made up of a federal government and federate entities with their own 
competencies, i.e., three economic regions (the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels-capital regions) 
and three linguistic communities (the Flemish Community, the French Community, also called 
the Wallonia-Brussels Federation, and the German-speaking Community), which use the three 
official languages: Dutch, French and German. This structure is the result of an ongoing process 
of federalisation and devolution that began in 1970. Following the Sixth State Reform, the sec-
ond step of which occurred in 2014, public health competencies were redistributed and mainly 
split between the federal and regional levels, which explains why there are several health min-
isters in Belgium (see Appendix 1 summarising the distribution of health competencies in Bel-
gium). The IC4BH plan was originally initiated at the federal level, but the federal authorities 
intended to develop some elements that are now under the competence of the regions, which 
explains why the IC4BH plan is a joint plan.
Methods
This inductive ethnographic study began in December 2016. Ethnography, also referred to as 
field research, is a holistic discovery-based and hypothesis-free research method emanating 
from the social sciences (Robinson, 2013), more specifically, from anthropology and sociology 
(Soukup et al., 2017). In this approach, people and groups are studied in their real-world set-
tings, in other words, “mundane settings in which people lead their lives naturally and that are 
not designed for the purposes of research” (Maner, 2016, p. 101), such as schools, homes, the 
workplace, hospitals, meetings, court rooms, etc. (Maner, 2016; Soukup et al., 2017). Accord-
ingly, ethnographic studies distinguish themselves from experimental ones, which are con-
ducted in simulated or controlled environments (Angrosino, 2007; Soukup et al., 2017). 
Field research is characterised by the combination of several complementary research methods 
(observation, interviews, secondary data analysis), allowing a deep and detailed understanding 
of a setting, a context and/or a phenomenon (Quivy & Campenhoudt, 2009), which is why it 
seemed relevant to study the integrated care pilot projects’ dynamics depending on interac-
tions between stakeholders. This type of research is inherently flexible and non-linear given 
that no definitive research protocol is determined at the beginning of the research, but rather 
is expected to evolve during the research (Quivy & Campenhoudt, 2009). This approach has its 
limitations: conducting field work is time consuming and the findings are often not generalis-
able (Soukup et al., 2017). However, as Flyvbjerg (2006) puts it, the fact that, “knowledge can-
3 — http://www.riziv.fgov.be/fr/themes/cout-remboursement/par-mutualite/maison-medicale/Pages/default.aspx#.
WapxpMhJY2w (accessed on 20 January 2020)
4 — http://www.maisonmedicale.org/En-quelques-mots.html (accessed on 20 January 2020)
5 — http://www.lejournaldumedecin.com/actualite/plus-de-150-maisons-medicales-en-belgique/article-nor-
mal-22247.html (accessed on 20 January 2020)
6 — http://www.dhnet.be/actu/belgique/la-belgique-compte-plus-de-150-maisons-medicales-579f96fc35705dcbd-
70cf3a2 (accessed on 20 January 2020)
323De W i n te r  |  R e sha pi n g  hea lth  ca re  g ove r n a nce  u s in g  p i lo t  pro je ct s  a s  p ubl i c  p ol i c y. . .
not be formally generalized does not mean that it cannot enter into the collective process of 
knowledge accumulation in a given field or in a society” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 227). 
As part of her specific ethnographic research, which took the form of a qualitative and induc-
tive (Musselin, 2005) research, the researcher immersed herself mainly in two pilot projects. 
The data were collected during the conceptualisation phase, i.e., the application writing period, 
as well as during the first nine months of the execution phase, during which the pilot project 
consortia began to implement the loco-regional action plan they conceived during the concep-
tualisation phase. 
According to Dumez (2016), “a qualitative research approach only makes sense if it shows and 
analyses the intentions, the discourse and the actions and interactions of the actors, both from 
their point of view and from the researcher’s point of view” (Dumez, 2016, p. 13). To ensure 
the soundness of the analysis (Dumez, 2016), and achieve a sound level of saturation (Bryant 
& Charmaz, 2011), three types of information sources were triangulated: 
•	 written documents, through a literature review and the reading of operational documents;
•	 actions and interactions: the direct observation method was used in which the researcher 
attended 67 meetings, corresponding to 148 hours of observation; and
•	 discourses, referring to what people had to say about their experience, during semi-struc-
tured interviews (N=24). 
Indeed, triangulation of information (Dumez, 2016; Jick, 1979) helps establish validity and re-
liability regarding the studied phenomenon (Robinson, 2013). Appendix 2 presents a thorough 
description of the methods combined to collect the data. 
Findings
Towards integrated care: opting for pilot projects
At the international level, integrated care is considered to be a relevant solution to deal with 
care fragmentation (Minkman, 2017) and tackle the challenge of long-term care patients 
(Borgermans & Devroey, 2017). Nevertheless, it can take a variety of forms depending on the 
context in which it is implemented (Borgermans et al., 2017). There is no consensus on one 
single and universal definition of this concept due to its polymorphous nature (Amelung et al., 
2017). In the IC4BH plan, integrated care delivery is defined as, “the management and deliv-
ery of health services so that clients receive a continuum of preventive and curative services, 
according to their needs over time and across different levels of the health system” (WHO, 
2008b, p. 1). Further, the World Health Organization (WHO) defines care integration as, “the 
organization and management of health services so that people get the care they need, when 
they need it, in ways that are user friendly, achieve the desired results and provide value for 
money” (WHO, 2008a, p. 1).  
National institutional arrangements and culture have a significant influence on how innova-
tive solutions are translated at the local level (Marmor et al., 2005). Health care systems result 
from specific building processes deeply linked to their history, traditions and national con-
texts (Minkman, 2017), which give them their “own individual equilibrium” (Schokkaert & 
Van de Voorde, 2011, p. 7). Transferring isolated policy measures from one country to another, 
without considering the context in which they will be implemented, can be fruitless or even 
risky (Schokkaert & Van de Voorde, 2011). Therefore, the Belgian authorities mobilised field 
workers, connoisseurs of the Belgian-specific context, as part of an iterative and incremental 
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implementation through pilot projects, the idea of co-creation being the guiding thread of the 
process.
Indeed, other implementation methods could have been used. As an example, the authorities 
could have passed a law after having negotiated the reform, as usual, in the decision-making 
organs of the NIHDI, two of the most important ones being:
•	 the “General Council of the Health Insurance”, which gathers employers’ representatives, 
workers’ representatives, government’s representatives and insurers’ representatives 
(healthcare mutuals);
•	 the “Health Insurance Comity”, which gathers insurers’ representatives and healthcare 
providers’ representatives (INAMI, 2019). 
However, the authorities opted for another way of proceeding, as already explained. Why, then, 
were workers mobilised in the field specifically through pilot projects? Here are some of the 
reasons explaining this choice that were mentioned during the interviews: 
We discovered the international reference framework [of integrated care], which was 
not very well known in our country, to help us put in place a real action plan by choos-
ing to embark on a bottom-up approach. And we had good reasons, because we knew 
very well that trying to fundamentally change the way care is organised, if we want 
to do it in a [traditional] concerted way, we will never reach a national consensus; it's 
impossible. We are not going to get all the medical unions and all the hospital net-
works and everyone to agree ... Oh yes, yes, we are going to change. That's not how it 
works. So, the only way, the idea, and I still believe in it, is that we can change things 
through a bottom-up approach. If we do it in a sufficiently substantial and global 
manner […], it is much better supported by [specific] needs or by a way of demon-
strating that we succeeded in shifting the paradigm. This is change management, but 
by looking for the avant-garde in it. (Interview with a high-ranking official, 2017)
Pilot projects are […] less frightening than a change of law, regulation or financing 
mode.  (Interview with a high-ranking official, 2017) 
The important thing is really to set up a methodology so that all things are taken 
into account, and that it is also sufficiently participatory because the element of co-
creation is really essential for me in this project, and I often stress this. Sometimes, 
more than the result to be achieved, it's the whole method to get there that is very 
important, the involvement of all the actors.  (Interview with a coach, 2017)
In these extracts, the interviewees expressed the advantages and the reasons that led to the 
choice of pilot projects as implementation instruments. The first interviewee explained that 
the traditional way of making decisions, at the level of the NIHDI bodies, would simply have 
hindered finding an agreement on how to implement integrated care due to the diverging in-
terests of the represented sectors. Such an agreement would, nevertheless, have been a pre-
requisite to any legal text intended to bring about structural changes in the way of working in 
the care sector. Therefore, the use of pilot projects was a way around this problem. The purpose 
was to show that some projects would succeed in implementing integrated care in their geo-
graphic area, hopefully serve as successful examples and produce a snowball effect in the areas 
in which no integrated care projects were implemented. The second interviewee stressed that 
the actions undertaken at a small scale, at the pilot project level, should be less frightening 
for hands-on professionals because they are more reversible than those that would have been 
directly implemented on a large scale to comply with the law. Finally, the third interviewee un-
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derlined the importance of working in co-creation with hands-on professionals. Professionals 
should be able to produce innovative propositions anchored in their day-to-day reality, includ-
ing contextual elements that the authorities would not have considered.
Integrated care pilot projects
At the federal level, the inter-administrative cell (IAC) was created pursuant to the Protocol of 
Understanding of the Inter-ministerial Conference of the 24th February, 2014 regarding the 
health policy for chronic patients. The IAC was assigned the role to manage and coordinate the 
operational implementation of the plan, and to help, guide and collaborate with the pilot pro-
jects as part of the iterative and incremental co-creation dynamic. This department gathered 
public officials of the NIHDI and of the Federal Public Service (FPS) Public Health. They also 
worked in close collaboration with representatives of the federal health minister’s office (Bel-
gian Ministry of Social Affairs and Public Health, 2015).  
Figure 1 – The inter-administrative cell
Source: The Author
In January 2016, the Belgian health authorities published a guidance leaflet for future pilot 
projects in which they described the specific modalities of the implementation process. This 
leaflet specifically stated that it was meant to be evolutionary: the modalities were meant to be 
modified, if necessary, and new guidelines could be articulated by the authorities in the future, 
depending on the turn of events. This relates to the willingness of iterative and incremental 
co-creation expressed by the authorities in the plan.
The implementation process was divided into four main phases (Belgian Ministry of Social Af-
fairs and Public Health, 2015): 
1. The preparation phase (first phase of the selection procedure): the four-month prepara-
tion phase began in February 2016, when the authorities launched a call for expressions 
of interest. Hands-on professionals, interested in creating a pilot project, had to gather 
in multidisciplinary local consortia. They had to submit a joint expression of interest 
defining, approximately, their target groups, as well as the geographic area covered by 
their projects, by 31st May, 2016. 
2. The conceptualisation phase (second phase of the selection procedure): between July 
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2016 and September 2017, the 20 selected pilot project consortia had to write a more 
detailed application file containing a ‘loco-regional action plan’. This plan needed to de-
scribe their common vision and their strategic and operational objectives, as well as the 
actions they would implement to achieve their objectives if they were selected for the 
four-year execution stage. As from this phase, each consortium had to appoint a local co-
ordinator whose remit was to lead the process of creating the loco-regional action plan. 
The local coordinator was the main point of contact between the project and the authori-
ties. During this phase, a lump sum funding of 40,000 euros, payable in two instalments, 
was provided to pay the coordinator’s salary.
3. The execution phase: in January 2018, the twelve selected pilot projects entered the 
four-year execution phase and began to implement their loco-regional action plan.  
4. The expansion phase: after the execution phase, the successful pilot projects were ex-
pected to evolve to cover the entire Belgian population. 
It is clear that the two first phases were dedicated to designing the experiments that would 
be carried out in the field during the third phase. The third phase was actually both an imple-
mentation and experimentation phase. The expansion phase is intended to implement actions 
identified as best practices at a wider scale. 
 A continuous co-construction process
Achieving co-creation required regular contacts between the parties involved. During the prep-
aration and the conceptualisation phases, several meetings (“kick off meetings”, information 
and plenary sessions and “intervisions”) bringing together the IAC members, some representa-
tives of the federal health minister’s office, the coordinators and some pilot project members 
were organised to this end. The first three types of meetings were more formal and less regular 
than the intervisions, which were organised on a monthly basis. 
Intervisions were key moments of discussion between the authorities, the coordinators and 
the pilot projects’ key stakeholders who accompanied them. The authorities gave presenta-
tions on specific topics, provided additional instructions and new guidelines and answered 
coordinators’ questions. The coordinators also had the opportunity to relay the difficulties, 
fears, disagreements and requests of their respective pilot project consortium and ask for clari-
fication regarding some elements or procedures. They also communicated with their peers and 
discussed their respective practices. 
Figure 2 – Stakeholders’ interaction during intervisions
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Source: The Author
Intervisions were not often peaceful due to the frequent divergence of opinion regarding sever-
al matters between the authorities and the pilot project members, whose opinions were relayed 
by the coordinators. For instance, one disagreement pertained to financial aspects and, more 
precisely, to the notion of ‘bundled payment’. 
Actually, in July 2011, the Belgian Health Care Knowledge Centre (KCE), a research centre that 
provides scientific advice on topics related to health care, was asked to produce a position paper 
related to future health care for chronic diseases. This scientific report, published in December 
2012, summarised the challenges in this field through eighteen integrated care components 
(see Appendix 3), based on a consultation with experts and a thorough international literature 
study regarding integrated care (Belgian Ministry of Social Affairs and Public Health, 2015). 
The IC4BH plan is an attempt to put into practice these recommendations. 
One of the 20 KCE recommendations, which became the 12th of the 20 components of the 
IC4BH plan, referred to the adaptation of financing systems. As a reminder, the majority of 
physicians are self-employed and remunerated on a fee-for-service basis; however, the federal 
authorities expressed their intention to move from a fee-for-service system to a bundled pay-
ment model, at least for certain types of medical services, justifying their choice by reference 
to the international scientific literature regarding this topic. 
In this literature, one can read that fee-for-service rewards volume instead of quality of care 
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(Borgermans & Devroey, 2017; Hirsch et al., 2015) and can therefore hinder the implementa-
tion of integrated care based on a global patient-centred approach. A bundled payment system 
would seem more appropriate according to the scientific literature (Quinn et al., 2017). Bun-
dled payment actually refers to, “a fixed payment that includes the prices of a group of services 
that would typically treat an episode of care in a defined period of time” (Quinn et al., 2017, 
p. 114). Using bundled payments could help neutralise expenses, enhance value of care and, 
consequently, enhance the system’s sustainability at the macro-level.
As a result, during the conceptualisation phase, the authorities encouraged the pre-project 
consortia to include actions in their loco-regional action plans that would help develop and test 
bundled payment at the local project scale. However, professionals in the field quickly opposed 
this request for several reasons, which surprised the authorities given all the advantages of this 
payment model identified in the literature. 
In an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion, professionals argued that the concrete imple-
mentation modalities of such a transition were not clear enough. They did not have sufficient 
guarantees of support from the authorities to achieve this economic transition. Here is an 
interview extract illustrating this idea: “It is like buying a car. But, when you drive it, you realise 
that they are still building the car while you are driving it and you cannot get out of it anymore.” (In-
terview with a coordinator, 2017).   
Furthermore, this would require a huge cultural change at every level of the Belgian care pro-
duction chain. They stressed that the authorities wanted to impose things and put the cart 
before the horse regarding this matter, arguing that Belgium is not yet ready for bundled pay-
ments: “I cannot prevent myself from thinking that it is pretending to be bottom-up and is really 
top-down. They are going to compel us to work in a certain way.” (Interview with a pilot project 
member, 2016). 
While this choice is understandable at the macro level given that it could help reduce health 
expenditure, at the micro level, the professionals were worried, particularly the doctors, be-
cause their remuneration mode and their income would probably be impacted. As such, what 
would be a saving for the government would be a loss of income for medical professionals. In-
deed, bundled payment transfers the risk from payers to providers, sometimes even resulting 
in financial losses for the latter (Quinn et al., 2017). Some GPs even threatened to leave their 
respective projects, which would have simply prevented the other stakeholders from submit-
ting the application at the end of the conceptualisation phase: GPs were, indeed, mandatory 
project members.
At the request of those in the field (not only GPs), several additional meetings were set up to 
discuss the matter. This, among other factors, contributed to lengthening the conceptualisa-
tion phase, which was supposed to finish at the end of January 2017, but which actually ended 
mid-September 2017. Both parties tried to convince the other of the validity of their vision 
based on different types of arguments, i.e., scientific- (authorities) or experience-based (field 
workers). In the end, despite the authorities’ insistence, no project complied with the request 
of designing actions to test actual bundled payment during the execution phase. Actually, 
[the authorities] adapt, they are open to discussion with the projects but in this case, 
they [simply] had no choice. [They] felt that if GPs blocked the integrated care pilot 
projects, there would not be any integrated care pilot project anymore. [Dealing with] 
chronic diseases without GPs is not feasible.  (Interview with a pilot project coordina-
tor, 2018) 
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This empirical example illustrates the strong interdependence between the different hierarchi-
cal levels of the health care system. Here are some other interview excerpts confirming this 
assertion: 
Obviously, the powerful argument of pilot project professionals is to say: ‘anyway, 
without us, what do you want to do? If no one wants to participate in your pilot 
projects, what are you [the authorities] going to do?’ (Interview with a pilot project 
member, 2018) 
Could they compel [us to do what they want us to do]? No […], but what is the alter-
native? If we [hands-on professionals] do not comply voluntarily, we may be com-
pelled. That is the threat. [The authorities could say]: ‘if you do not want it, then, we 
will see if we cannot pass a Royal Decree’.  (Interview with a pilot project member, 
2018)
Change is frightening. […] We [the authorities] know that there is a lot to do in the 
field. It is for this reason that it seems essential to take action at several levels and 
with hands-on professionals, because we cannot impose change alone. We can write 
a Royal Decree but … (Interview with a high-ranking official, 2017)
If we want to change things, dialogue [is a compulsory step]. (Interview with a pilot 
project member, 2018), people from all the levels have to gather and negotiate. 
Discussion 
In an explorative context, workers in the field were delegated the task to both design and test 
new actions intended, if successful and identified as best practices, to develop integrated care 
for chronic patients on a national scale. The Belgian authorities chose to use pilot projects and 
mobilise hands-on professionals’ experience and expertise:
•	 to avoid the problems that the traditional way of doing things could have caused; 
•	 due to the contextual nature of integrated care (Amelung et al., 2017; Minkman, 2020) and 
the resulting lack of knowledge regarding the way integrated care could/should be imple-
mented in the Belgian context; and also
•	 to benefit from the professional experience of field workers.
In the literature on policy making and policy design, this “co-creation” approach relates to the 
notions of “collaborative innovation” (Torfing, 2019, p. 4) and “process inclusivity” (Compton 
et al., 2019, p. 124), which both refer to the degree to which diverse interests are represented 
in the decision-making process, inter alia those of the directly affected stakeholders. 
Including the latter in decision-making is considered desirable for several reasons. Given their 
experience and proximity with the field, they are expected to know the local context better, 
allowing them to produce tailored solutions and, as a result, solutions that are supposedly 
better. Furthermore, bottom-up collaboration between these stakeholders is also viewed as 
an advantage enhancing the legitimacy of the policy and helping build trust. Eventually, given 
that they will have a role to play in the implementation of the decisions made (Compton et al., 
2019; Lee, 1999), it is also expected to enhance the acceptance of these decisions (Vreugdenhil 
& Ker Rault, 2010). 
In the context of the IC4BH plan, the use of pilot projects was a way to achieve inclusivity by 
including workers in the field in the process and work of “co-creation” to benefit from their 
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respective experience (Gouillart & Hallett, 2015). Nevertheless, if this inclusive co-creation 
approach leading to multi-actor collaboration (Torfing, 2019) may be seen as a key facilitating 
factor (Compton et al., 2019), especially in a context of innovation (Torfing, 2019), an impor-
tant lesson to draw from this research is that this alone does not guarantee the achievement 
of the desired outcome or that events unfold as planned. This research actually suggests that it 
also brought with it new issues to address, as detailed below. 
New collaboration modalities
The co-creation approach called for regular meetings between the different stakeholders, creat-
ing new collaboration modalities. The meetings of the IAC members, representatives of the fed-
eral health minister’s office, the coordinators and key pilot project members, i.e., GPs, nurses, 
social workers, etc., contributed to progressively create a new dynamic of vertical interactions 
and vertical communication between stakeholders at the macro and the meso levels and, in 
this way, to alleviate the vertical organisational fragmentation between these levels. Gather-
ing these different types of people on a regular basis is quite unusual in Belgium. As already 
mentioned above, health matters are normally discussed in the decision-making organs of the 
NIHDI, in which all the sectors involved in the pilot projects are not represented.  
These specific meetings, which were particularly crucial throughout the process, had a goal to 
sustain the iterative and incremental co-creation process by providing the coordinators with 
support for the needs they had expressed. While these meetings were initially meant to be 
mostly informative, the participants appropriated the encounters, viewing them as a venue for 
expression, as opportunities to negotiate their participation in the projects or even call into 
question the content of the authorities’ guidelines, which surprised the authorities. 
The IC4BH plan is the result of a long reflection process in which, “knowledge [played] a funda-
mental justification function” (Radaelli, 1995, p. 174): the guidelines were built on the basis of 
scientific expertise on integrated care. Indeed, several Belgian public officials and policymakers 
took a closer look at successful cases of integrated care abroad; they attended scientific confer-
ences abroad on the topic and relied on the KCE position paper. 
Accordingly, “The relationship between expertise and politics has traditionally been described 
in terms of science speaking truth to power” (Pellizzoni, 2011, p. 765). Nevertheless, the rec-
ommendations and the guidelines designed by the authorities did not always seem relevant to 
the pilot projects’ stakeholders, as shown in the empirical example above pertaining to bundle 
payments. Their diverging opinions led to a cultural clash (Moran & Rau, 2016) and heated 
negotiations to deal with the controversy (Callon, 1984). Hands-on professionals openly ques-
tioned and negotiated the authorities’ guidelines built on scientific expertise, the legitimacy of 
which they put into question by justifying their opinion on the strength of their place-based 
knowledge of the health care system at the local level (Moran & Rau, 2016) related to their 
practice and their experience (Wagenaar & Cook, 2011).  
This example illustrates that, “instruments at work are not neutral devices: they produce spe-
cific effects, independently of the objective pursued (the aims ascribed to them), which struc-
ture public policy according to their own logic” (Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007, p. 3). Indeed, 
the use of pilot projects in a context of co-creation allowed their members to question and 
renegotiate the framework set by the authorities, which the latter did not expect. Pilot pro-
ject stakeholders took advantage of these moments of interaction to define, clarify or redefine 
their respective roles and responsibilities. They sometimes even refused to achieve what was 
expected of them, arguing that the authorities were imposing autocratic top-down measures 
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(O’Riordan et al., 2015) based on de-contextualised scientific knowledge (Moran & Rau, 2016), 
which was irrelevant in the Belgian-specific context. Not all of this would have been possible if 
the authorities had passed a law to implement the IC4BH plan. In this case, hands-on profes-
sionals would have been considered passive implementers who would have had to comply with 
the law, under the pain of sanctions. 
In the case of integrated care pilot projects, implementers (pilot project stakeholders) were 
involved in a decision-making process at the local level: they were responsible for building and 
implementing their own loco-regional action plans. They were supposed to be active and to be 
involved voluntarily in the co-creation process initiated by the authorities, which they were, 
but not always in the manner expected by the latter, as illustrated in the example of bundled 
payments. This situation gave power to pilot project stakeholders who had the opportunity to 
influence the course of events, bringing significant unpredictability to the process. 
Indeed, the result of local people’s reflections was often different from the authorities’ ex-
pectations and wishes. They were able to question everything and even leave the process at 
any time without sanction if they chose to do so, something the authorities feared given that 
they were depending on them to implement integrated care in Belgium. On the other hand, 
the local professionals feared that the authorities might pass a law to impose their framework 
without taking their opinion into account if they left the process, which explains why, even if 
some stakeholders threatened to give up and leave the process, few actually carried out this 
threat. Through their regular interactions, IAC members, health ministry representatives, as 
well as pilot project coordinators and key stakeholders (see Figure 2) transformed the IC4BH 
plan implementation modalities. In this way, they transformed the public policy itself, creating 
a tripartite, “crossed-regulation” (Crozier & Thoenig, 1975). This means that each of the three 
parties involved was regulating the others and was also regulated by them in return: they were 
actually interdependent (Crozier & Thoenig, 1975, p. 12) and each held power.
Eventually, a serendipitous observation lies in the fact this process was neither completely 
bottom-up, as the authorities argued, nor entirely top-down, as several pilot project stake-
holders put it. The authorities set the initial framework for action and determined the general 
aim, i.e., the metaproject (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2005) (implementing integrated care), which 
was non-negotiable. They articulated guidelines and took the initiative to launch the call for 
pilot projects to materialise this metaproject. This gave pilot project members the impression 
that the process, which was supposed to be bottom-up, was actually disguised top-down, and 
that this was not “real co-creation”. Nevertheless, as explained in the example above, pilot 
project stakeholders actually did have the opportunity to make proposals, negotiate things 
and influence the unfolding implementation process. Accordingly, if this was not co-creation, 
as pilot project stakeholders put it, it was at least a process punctuated by constant interac-
tions, discussions and negotiations, probably inherent in iterative and incremental innovation. 
Therefore, in general, the achieved result would never be completely what the authorities or the 
pilot project stakeholders anticipated, but would rather be the outcome of successive mutual 
adjustments between them (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2005).
Becoming representatives
According to Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007), “Every instrument constitutes a condensed form 
of knowledge about social control and ways of exercising it” (Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007, p. 
3). Using pilot projects to implement the plan has been reshaping, “the relationship between 
the governing [the usual decision-makers] and the governed [the usual implementers]” (Las-
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coumes & Le Galès, 2007, p. 7) and has had consequences in terms of citizenship. It has begun 
to blur the lines between these two statuses, creating a new intermediary local level at which 
people gather to design joint projects and make important decisions. 
Indeed, pilot project stakeholders (corresponding to the governed in Lascoumes and Le Galès’s 
framework) have been increasingly involved in the decision-making process. They have ac-
quired a certain capacity for influencing things and questioning the authorities’ framework by 
acting as representatives of their profession and of their project, a role to which they were not 
accustomed. Progressively, they have learned to assume this new role by taking part in pilot 
projects, exchanging ideas, and defending their interests and opinions. On the other hand, 
those at the macro level were put in a position in which they had to listen to the field workers’ 
demands and consider them in order to orient their future decisions and provide them with 
support. 
As a result, one can argue that the use of pilot projects supported the development of a “ne-
gotiated governance” (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2005, p. 23). This observation denotes a transi-
tion from a social guardian state, which commands and controls, towards a mobilising state 
(Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2007), which sets the general framework for action, provides general 
direction, mobilises local people by delegating some tasks to them, and lets them take concrete 
action to achieve the general aim, in this case achieving integrated care in Belgium. 
 An uncomfortable and risky endeavour 
In an iterative regime of innovation involving constant confrontation of opinions, the project 
approach generates discomfort, immersing stakeholders at every level in a climate of (some-
times huge) uncertainty. Setbacks and changes of direction are frequent, which provokes anxi-
ety and fatigue. As Segrestin (2004, p. 244) puts it, “they have embarked on projects as one 
would have on a risky expedition”, betting on the future without completely knowing what 
would be asked of them and to what this would actually lead, such as, for example, bundled 
payments. 
Except for the coordinators, no additional human resources were financed: pilot project mem-
bers took part voluntarily in pilot project meetings as representatives on a regular basis. This 
additional task required massive time investment, making their workload heavier and heavier 
and reducing the amount of time left to achieve their other tasks, for which some receive sub-
sidies from the Belgian federate entities. This created a situation in which they had to deal 
with several workloads (and sometime incompatible guidelines) attributed by different levels 
of power (federal level, federate entities).
As a result, field workers were put under pressure to take innovative initiatives, but had simul-
taneously to deal with many constraints (institutional, financial, organisational, legal, etc.), 
which reduced their flexibility. Incidentally, some interviewees stressed the psychological costs 
related to the process due to the heavy workload and the constant uncertainty inherent in the 
project’s approach. 
Conclusion
This paper addressed the following research question: how does the use of multidisciplinary 
pilot projects as experimentation and implementation instruments reshape modes of public 
governance in the Belgian health sector in a context of transition and ongoing devolution?  Ac-
tually, the use of pilot projects was a way to include workers in the field in the process in order 
to work in “co-creation” to benefit from their respective experience, and in this way achieve 
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process inclusivity. If process inclusivity is recognised in the scientific literature as a success 
factor, this research suggests that it is also important not to view it as something “magical” 
that alone can erase all uncertainties or guarantee the peaceful implementation of a policy. 
Instead, it also brings with it new issues and controversies to address. 
Indeed, one could have imagined, for example, that this new inclusive way of working would 
have resulted in a simple and peaceful transfer of tasks to the members of the pilot projects, 
the main task delegated being the design of innovative concrete actions to implement integrat-
ed care in Belgium. Instead, it seems that the use of pilot projects was progressively reshaping 
modes of public governance by transforming the roles of both the authorities and the actors 
involved in such projects, which were new roles that had to be learnt. The new authorities ‘role 
was to offer support, which, in this case, led to the creation of a new department, the IAC, 
dedicated to this support mission. On the other hand, pilot projects stakeholders still shoul-
dered the role of implementers as they would have traditionally; however, in this scenario, 
they had to implement actions that they themselves had designed, not actions designed by the 
authorities in collaboration with scientific experts. As such, in a certain way, they were both 
implementers and decisions-makers given that they had to make decisions about what should 
be done in the field. Therefore, the use of pilot projects, with an initial purpose of experimenta-
tion and implementation, also led to blurring the line between the roles of decision-maker and 
implementer. 
Importantly, this role transformation required new modalities of collaboration between the 
authorities and pilot project consortia. It led to the emergence of new practices: regular meet-
ings between people who usually did not meet. Indeed, the iterative and incremental transi-
tion towards integrated care required that the authorities and local professionals collaborate 
closely. To that end, they met on a regular basis, notably during monthly intervisions. This led 
to building bridges between the different levels of the care production chain, notably between 
ministry representatives, public officials (IAC members) and pilot project stakeholders, result-
ing in the emergence of vertical collaboration, and one can even suggest the emergence of 
the early stages of an organisational vertical integration (Axelsson & Axelsson, 2006). In this 
context, the local professionals progressively learned to assume the new role of representa-
tives of their project and profession, which is symptomatic of a more negotiated governance 
(Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2005).
Nevertheless, given that these different stakeholders each had their own logic of action (ex-
pertise-based vs. practice-based), some unexpected controversies emerged during the process, 
e.g., regarding financial aspects. This example shows that pilot project members succeeded in 
influencing the process and calling into question the framework set by the authorities, which 
the latter did not expect. Accordingly, they all entered a non-linear and sometimes conflictual 
process of constant interactions, discussions, negotiations and successive mutual adjustments 
as part of a tripartite crossed-regulation (Crozier & Thoenig, 1975), symptomatic of process 
inclusivity concretely put into practice. 
The lesson to be drawn here is that interacting is a first, but not a sufficient, step to achieve 
real co-creation, which should result in vertical integration. Real co-creation requires that all 
stakeholders, regardless of their position in the care production chain (so, policy-makers in-
cluded), interact regularly and expect controversies or even cultural clashes to emerge. Over-
coming these differences of opinion involves making the effort to stand in the shoes of others 
to understand their respective day-to-day realities by really listening to what they have to say, 
which does not seem to be a natural practice at present. The research therefore underlines that 
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the project approach also has its limitations: the additional workload, the inherent constant 
(sometimes conflictual) confrontation of opinions and changes of direction creating an un-
comfortable climate of uncertainty, all of which raise questions in terms of well-being at work. 
In conclusion, the results of this research might be of interest to policy makers who wish to use 
pilot projects to test and implement policies, in the health sector but also in other sectors. Nev-
ertheless, further research is needed to establish the generalisability of the findings presented 
in this paper regarding the pilot project phenomenon. They should be put into perspective 
with the results of other research, such as, for example, similar research focusing on other pilot 
projects, both in Belgium and abroad, in the health sector or even in sectors such as education, 
employment and social action, among others. This would help identify what is specific for each 
sector regarding the use of pilot projects and what are common characteristics of the instru-
ment pilot project, whatever the sector in which it is used.
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Appendix
Appendix 1 – Distribution of health competencies in Belgium
Belgian Federal State Flemish, Walloon and Brussels-capital 
regions
Managing the compulsory health insurance Prevention and health promotion 
Defining care professions as well as the re-
quired associated skills and qualifications 
Organising front-line care and services 
Setting medical fee standards for doctors, 
nurses, midwives, physiotherapists, dieticians, 
dentists, etc. 
Developing new instruments to support front-
line care providers, apart from that which is 
related to health insurance matters
Defining and allocating admitted medical acts 
between the different professions mentioned 
above
Financing general practitioners’ associations 
and defining the rules related to their govern-
ance
Managing medical on-call services. Managing the multidisciplinary local net-
works, the integrated home care services, the 
palliative care associations, the multidiscipli-
nary palliative teams and the “Impulseo fund”, 
which is a specific fund for general medicine 
created to provide general practitioners with 
financial help regarding their settlements
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Appendix 2 – Research Methods









A literature study was conducted regarding the following topics: integrated 







Several political, legal and operational documents were read, notably the 
joint plan itself and the documents available on the website http://www.
integreo.be/fr/documentation. This website is a communication tool cre-
ated by the public authorities on which documents relating to the IC4BH 
implementation plan were published, including political and legal docu-
ments, fact sheets, templates and application guidelines, and PowerPoint 
presentations. Analysis of these documents provided an overview of 
the issues authorities sought to communicate and the information they 
wished to be explicitly known. The researcher also read and analysed the 
documents produced by the pilot projects she focused on throughout her 
fieldwork.







The researcher attended several types of meetings as an external observer 
and took field notes for every one of those. In total, she attended 67 meet-
ings, which correspond to 148 hours of observation. She spent 105 hours 
observing the meetings of two pilot projects (e.g., preparatory meetings 
during the conceptualisation phase, follow-up meetings during the execu-
tion phase): 35 hours for the first project and 70 hours for the second. 
The researcher also attended specific meetings, called plenary sessions and 
“intervisions”, organised by the public authorities (43 hours). 
Regarding the analysis of the collected information, the notes taken were 
read several times to have a precise and global understanding of the course 
of events and also in order to put into perspective the qualitative data col-
lected with those gathered during the interviews.  
340 In te r n a t ion a l  R e v ie w o f  P ubl i c  Pol i c y,  2 :3








Twenty-four semi-structured interviews were conducted by the researcher 
with different categories of actors identified thanks to the snowball effect. 
These were people with whom the researcher had no prior relationship: 
•	 policy-advisers and public officials involved in devising and imple-
menting the new policy (n=9)
•	 pilot project coordinators (n=8)
•	 different pilot project stakeholders, e.g., general practitioners, 
nurses, social workers, etc. (n=7)
The purpose of meeting these people was to identify, through their dis-
course, their formal and informal roles, the way they personally experi-
enced the process, their knowledge (what they knew, but also what they 
did not know) and their feelings about it. A new interview guide was writ-
ten for each of them. These interviews lasted between 33 and 98 min-
utes; they were all fully recorded, transcribed, read several times and then 
analysed manually through open coding, again by the researcher working 
alone. Open coding is a method of analysis from grounded theory meth-
odology that allows the emergence of ad hoc core categories identified in 
the empirical material through repeated successive readings (Bryant & 
Charmaz, 2011). 
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Appendix 3 – Integrated care components
18 components of integrated care
1. Empowerment
2. Support for caregivers
3. Case-management
4. Maintenance at work as well as educational, professional and social reintegration
5. Prevention
6. Dialogue and coordination
7. Care continuity (extramural, intramural and transmural)
8. Accenting the experience of patients and families’ organisations and of mutual 
health insurances
9. Integrated electronic health records
10. Multidisciplinary guidelines
11. Development of a quality culture
12. Adaptation of financing systems 
13. Risk stratification and resources mapping 
14. Change management
15. Training for professionals regarding empowerment and multidisciplinary collabo-
ration
16. Continuing training regarding integrated care
17. Evaluation of the system performance 
18. Attractiveness of professions
Source : Belgian Ministry of Social Affairs and Public Health, 2015, p. 10
